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Reshaping Metro Manila 
Gentrification, Displacement, 
and the Challenge Facing the 
Urban Capital
Globalization and liberal economic reforms provide both 
opportunities and threats for developing cities. It can bring 
much needed capital and economic development but also at 
the possible cost of displacement and marginalization. Metro 
Manila contributes US$7.7 billion to the Philippine economy by 
remaining competitive in attracting and facilitating the flow 
of capital. However, this economic development translates to 
displacement, with its very citizens being affected. We analyze 
this phenomenon through the existing literature on Metro 
Manila and gentrification.
 This paper addresses the key questions: Who are the 
key players in Metro Manila’s gentrification? What are the 
implications of their actions? In this analysis, we use Neil Smith’s 
gentrification framework. We find that the key players involved 
in this development have prioritized competitiveness by 
facilitating capital in a globalized world at the cost of ignoring 
Metro Manila’s marginalized households. To continually ensure 
capital, the private sector has captured Metro Manila with the 
urban elites benefiting the most. 
 Metro Manila has been successful in attracting capital and 
economic progress, but exclusively for consumers who can 
afford it. While this paper is primarily descriptive in nature, 
we hope to pose this as a challenge for government to pursue 
stronger inclusive policies in the urban capital.
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Saskia Sassen, a noted sociologist on globalization, famously outlined 
the strategic role that global cities such as London, New York, and 
Tokyo, have taken in the global economy. !ese cities now function 
as the global economy’s command points, key locations for "nance 
and specialized services, hubs for innovation, and ready markets for 
the products produced by such innovations (Sassen 1991). More 
than twenty years on and the “global city” discourse has successfully 
entrenched itself well into the realm of public policy (Machimura 
1998). !us, we see that governments around the world are on a drive 
to achieve this coveted global city status. !is is with the belief that 
it is the best way to attract and harness the increasingly transnational 
#ow of capital in the globalized economy. One such way global cities 
ensure that they remain competitive is to host projects and events 
which guarantee the #ow of capital. Examples of these are Singapore’s 
drive to open casino resorts by building the Marina Bay Sands, and 
London’s trumpeted hosting of the 2012 Summer Olympics. As for 
aspiring global cities, they also have similar initiatives which signify 
their aspiration—such as the Kuala Lumpur City Center project, 
which includes the Petronas Towers, (Bunnell and Barter 2002, 357) 
which were the tallest twin buildings in the world for a time, and 
Istanbul’s drive to host various global arts festival, which culminated 
in being declared as “European Capital of Culture in 2010” (Göktürk 
et al. 2010).
Metro Manila, the national capital of the Philippines also wants 
to be part of this global city discourse. !e urban capital has started 
developments that are similar to other global cities’ initiatives. One 
example is London, where the recent hosting of the 2012 Summer 
Olympics led to various urban regeneration projects. In particular, the 
newly built West"eld London shopping center served as the grand 
gateway to the Olympic Park. We note and compare this with Bonifacio 
Global City, a privately-developed urban area in Metro Manila.
On the surface, this re#ects how such global city aspirations are 
the same, namely, to become a market-oriented and market-friendly 
urban environment (Machimura 1998). As the photos show, the two 
developments are not quite exactly the same, but one could easily 
substitute for the other. Two similarities stand out: their purpose and 
the pro"le of their builders. !e purpose of both projects was to create 
more economic opportunities by serving as an urban regeneration 
initiative. For London, the Olympic Stadium area was formerly 
brown"eld land, and a shopping mall was constructed as a grand 
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Figure 2. Bonifacio Global City in Metro Manila. Author’s photo.
 
Figure 1. Westfield Stratford City in London. Author’s photo.
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gateway to the Olympic area in order to capitalize on the potential 
consumers that the Olympics would bring. For Metro Manila, the 
original site was military land which was undeveloped; the government 
needed to attract capital and thus invited the private sector to develop 
the area. !is leads us to the next similarity, which is that both were 
constructed by the private sector and were designed by international 
"rms. In London, West"eld Stratford City is owned by the West"eld 
Group, an Australian company, which has shopping centers located 
around the world. Meanwhile in Metro Manila, Bonifacio Global 
City was designed by Hellmuth, Obata, and Kassabaum, a US-based 
architecture and engineering "rm with major projects across the 
globe. Firms such as these are present where cities want to be seen 
as competitive in this global economy. Because of this, strategies 
for cities have taken similar form—but the impact of globalization 
always depends upon the local context. Upon closer analysis in the 
Metro Manila experience, we argue that what is happening is not 
urban regeneration, but a displacement of residents. We observe that 
the particular process in the Philippines is characterized by an overtly 
market-friendly environment that is led by the private sector and is 
quite unsustainable in a service economy. Based upon this, we argue 
that the most appropriate framework to be utilized for this analysis is 
gentri!cation. 
Before proceeding further, we must take note of the di#erence 
on urban regeneration and gentri!cation. Couch et al. (2003, 2) de"nes 
urban regeneration as “concerned with the re-growth of economic 
activity where it has been lost … and social inclusion where there has 
been exclusion.” It is a normative concept which has roots in British 
urban policy which addresses urban decline, decay, and economic 
and social transformation (Imrie et al. 2009, 4). Can urban projects 
found in Metro Manila be considered as urban regeneration? !e 
simple answer is that while these create economic opportunities, social 
inclusion is not being achieved. In fact, as we shall see later, it is a factor 
for displacement. !is is the reason why we use gentri"cation as a 
framework. !e literature on gentri"cation traditionally associates the 
concept as something more localized and con"ned to neighborhoods 
(Lees et al. 2008). However, we argue that the gentri"cation process 
in Metro Manila is happening and accelerating by huge urban chunks, 
which are reshaping the image of the urban capital. Consistent with 
the global city discourse, developing countries design cities according 
to the best way to attract capital and investors (Drakakis-Smith 
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2000, 7) hence the dominance of a market-friendly or, some would 
say, neoliberal agenda in this globalized economy. But this also raises 
the question whether such a design includes the most vulnerable 
residents of a city, that is, the low-income residents. We argue that the 
gentri!cation experience in the Philippines leads to di"erent kinds of 
displacement: actual displacement, design displacement, and non-places 
displacement (the latter draws from the French anthropologist Marc 
Augé’s [1995] concept of non-places, a place of transience which does 
not hold signi!cance). #e purpose of this paper will be to critically 
discuss the process of gentri!cation and its impact on Metro Manila 
as a strategy to achieve global city status. We aim to do this in two 
parts. #e !rst part of the essay will have a description of Metro 
Manila to give shape the local context, followed by a discussion of the 
gentri!cation framework to be utilized. #e second part will discuss 
the gentri!cation of Metro Manila as it attracts and facilitates capital, 
but at the cost of displacement. We hope to begin describing what is 
particularly the Filipino experience in gentri!cation. 
THE CAPITAL CITY SHOWING ECONOMIC PROGRESS
#e Philippines is regularly identi!ed by investors and investment 
agencies as an emerging economy. It was able to weather the 2008 
!nancial crisis through strong consumption backed by US$20 billion 
overseas remittances (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas [BSP] 2013) and 
a fast-growing service sector economy fuelled by outsourcing growth 
(Usui 2012, 1). #e Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(HSBC), a British bank, even projects that the country, given the right 
economic policy conditions, could be the 16th largest economy by 
2050 (Business Mirror 2012). More recently, Fitch Ratings upgraded 
the country to its !rst ever “investment grade” status, which signi!es 
a stable economic outlook and potential (InterAksyon 2013). At the 
heart of this country’s economic prospect and progress is the urban 
capital region of Metro Manila. 
Metro Manila is the country’s premier urban center, encompassing 
seventeen administrative cities and resting on 636 km2 of land. A 
population of 11.5 million and growth rate of 2.25 percent per 
year make it the densest and fastest-growing region in the country. 
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2006, vii), this 
population growth comes from the in$ux of large numbers of domestic 
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migrants in search of employment and better income opportunities. 
!e urban region is also considered the economic capital of the 
Philippines because it contributes a disproportionate amount of 33 
percent to the national economy (Porio 2012, 8). However, alongside 
the disproportionate national wealth, almost 37 percent of the city, or 
4 million residents, live in slums (Ballesteros 2010). !e history of the 
country is also a history of the urban region since Manila is the seat of 
political power in the Philippines; it is where the President and many 
national government o"ces are headquartered.
!e city’s history is dotted with foreign in#uences. Manila $rst 
started as a small tribal settlement by a local Muslim leader. By 1521, the 
Spaniards turned it into the seat of the Catholic Church and the State 
for more than 300 years. By 1899, the Americans then colonized it for 
$fty years, interrupted by three years of Japanese occupation during the 
Second World War. It is only during the post-war years that the city saw 
reconstruction and expansion on what was then primarily farm land. 
!ere was a growth of factories and industrial areas in various parts 
of the urban area alongside residential villages to house an increasing 
population (Ragragio 2003, 2). !e economic strategy after the war was 
“import-substitution,” which meant replacing foreign imports with 
domestic production, and which led to the diversi$cation of industry 
and their protection by high-tari%s. Industries were established and 
maintained with support from the national government. But as 
Bello (2004, 9–11) argued, without land reform like those of Taiwan 
and Korea, which led to income redistribution, this strategy was 
unsustainable, owing the fact to the presence of a very narrow market 
due to massive income inequality. !e Marcos era (1965–1986) saw a 
shift to export promotion, liberalization of trade, and foreign exchange 
upon prompting by multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (ibid.). Another pillar of the Marcos 
strategy was the labor export policy which aimed to address the 
problem of unemployment and income-generation, owing to the lack 
of dynamism in the export strategy (Haggard 1990). !ese Overseas 
Foreign Workers, more popularly known as OFWS, were supposed to 
be a temporary solution, but became a national strategy in propping up 
the economy. Today, they are such a crucial part of the economy that 
they already account for 10 percent of the GDP, or US$21.39 billion. 
!is is why successive administrations have upheld this strategy (BSP 
2013). It was also during this time that the Marcos presidency declared 
martial law in 1972, and a dictatorship was installed, thus creating 
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a highly centralized government system. Even though technocrats 
were in place in key economic policy-making agencies, “the political 
logic of cronyism placed major obstacles in the path of serious reform” 
(Hutchcroft 1999, 476). !is proved economically unstable for the 
dictatorship, and the country experienced a large debt crisis which 
resulted in major economic collapse. In 1986, the Marcos dictatorship 
was replaced by the Aquino presidency, with the wife of the slain 
national hero, who was one of the key "gures in the peaceful revolution 
more popularly known as People Power. We note that under her term, 
the administration implemented two major policies that also saw the 
continued expansion of the service economy (Bello 2004; Dumol 
2000; Guevara 2000). 
!e "rst major policy was the rule of limited government and 
the expansion of the private sector (Bello 2004; Dumol 2000), which 
was partly in reaction to the dictatorship through the removal of 
industries from the Marcos cronies, and partly because many of her 
council of advisers came from the private sector (ibid.). !is continued 
liberalization reached its “apogee” under the Ramos administration, 
when key positions were occupied by free-market-oriented policy 
makers (Bello 2004). !e second policy was the process of devolution 
or decentralization to the local government units (LGU) (Porio 2012; 
Guevarra 2000). According to Asanuma et al. (cited in Porio 2012), 
decentralization meant a way to di#use power from the center and 
also to prevent another authoritarian era from happening. In 1991, the 
Local Government Code was legislated to institutionalize a systematic 
allocation of powers and responsibilities between the national 
government and the LGUs (Guevara 2000, 98). As for the continued 
expansion of the service sector, it was the only one which has recorded 
positive growth since the 1970s (Balisacan and Hill 2003). But they 
also note that “there is no clear and obvious explanation for the 
continuing rise in services” (ibid., 15). Regardless, we cannot discount 
the fact that the service sector is a key characteristic of the Philippine 
economy that continues up to this day.
Currently, these policies have not changed much; they paint a 
nuanced picture of Metro Manila. !e policy of continued economic 
liberalization has continued with successive governments—from the 
privatization of the telecommunications, power, and water industry under 
the Ramos government (Bello 2004), to the major thrust in private-
sector participation in the Public Private Partnership (PPP) program 
of the current Aquino (the "rst President Aquino’s son) government. 
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As evidence, this economic liberalization translated into new businesses 
being formed. From 1975 to 1985, only 4,500 were formed annually 
and increased to 6,000 by 1986 to 1990 (Connell 1999, 142; Pinches 
1996, 115–19). Metro Manila was the locus of the deregulation and 
privatized industries. For example, when the telecommunications 
monopoly was abolished, the number of telephone connections 
quadrupled to 4.1 per 100 persons, with 45 percent of these connections 
located in the urban capital (Spreitzhofer 2002, 258). Another example: 
the biggest water privatization deal in the world during its time 
(Dumol 2000) took place in Metro Manila, which continues to this day. 
However, Hutchcroft (1999) paints a somber picture of the Philippine 
economy: he says it su!ers from a “patrimonial oligarchic state,” more 
popularly known as “booty capitalism.” Booty capitalism describes 
a weak separation between the “o"cial” and “private” sphere, where 
major power is found in the private sector. #us, a “powerful oligarchic 
business class plunders the state for particularistic advantage” (ibid., 
476). Metro Manila was also decentralized with the implementation 
of the Local Government Code in 1991. #e law vastly stripped Metro 
Manila of a central regional urban government, with only a weakened 
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) (Naerssen 
et al. 1996) acting as a coordinating body for shared services, such as 
tra"c coordination. #e local autonomy of the seventeen administrative 
cities in Metro Manila is $rmly entrenched. As a prime example of this, 
the MMDA fails to implement a tra"c scheme called the Uniform 
Vehicle Volume Reduction Program. It’s a scheme which excludes cars 
ending in certain numbers from travelling the road on certain days. 
For example, on Tuesdays, cars ending in “3” or “4” are disallowed to 
travel from 7:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M., save for a “window” from 10:00 
A.M. to 3:00 P.M., wherein they can travel freely. #e purpose of 
this is to decongest the already full roads of Metro Manila. However, 
because of decentralization, each local government implements its own 
speci$c policy. #us, cities like Makati and Las Piñas do not follow the 
“window” hours between 10:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M., while Marikina 
and Taguig do not follow the program at all. #e urban area is now 
ruled by seventeen administrative cities, with their own mayors who 
implement their own brand of governance and policies. While some 
acknowledge that it has generated successes in the form of excellence 
awards and the sharing of best practices for LGUs (Guevarra 2004), 
there are others who observe that it has led to corruption, patron-client 
relationships, and elite-dominated structures (Porio 2012). 
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!e continuing liberalization of market-oriented policies, a 
decentralized local government structure, and major contribution of 
the service sector "t the contemporary role of Metro Manila’s urban 
economy. !is new urban economy involves the decisive shift to “the 
growth of services as the core of urban economic activity” (Amin 
2000, 116). !e services now cater to the urban consumers such as 
o#ce-based workers, professionals, and residents. It also supports 
the productive economy with banking, insurance, and accountancy. 
!e urban economy is increasingly associated with the production, 
exchange, and consumption of services (ibid.). !e service sector not 
only characterizes the economy of Metro Manila, but is increasingly 
becoming one of the major sources of revenue for the Philippines. !e 
statistics from the ADB and the government statistics agency (Usui 
2012; National Statistical and Coordination Board 2008) show that 
the service economy presently contributes 55 percent to the GDP. 
!is industry employs about 50 percent of the workforce, and these 
services are mainly located in Metro Manila. One prime example of 
this interplay of policies and the urban economy is the business process 
outsourcing (BPO) service sector, which performs services such as 
call-center activities, tele-marketing, accounting, and other back-o#ce 
professional services from other countries, mostly from Western-
developed nations. It is a triumph of market-oriented policy. Of the 
total US$2 billion investment, about 93 percent represented foreign 
equity participation (Yi 2012). !is was done through very market-
friendly policies initiated by the government’s Bureau of Investments 
and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority, which can grant "scal 
incentives such as tax holidays, and even de"ne the boundaries of an 
export processing zone to a single building (McKay 2006). A way that 
decentralization bene"ted the service economy is the way Metro Manila 
hosted these companies. !ey have actively courted these companies 
by espousing the labor and infrastructure that these cities hold. As an 
example, Quezon City, an administrative city in Metro Manila and one 
of the pioneers in hosting the industry, created a Quezon City BPO-
ICT (Information and Communications Technology) Council whose 
purpose is “to attend to the needs of these businesses and prospective 
locators” (Quezon City 2009). !is has shown success by Metro 
Manila hosting about 75 percent of total employees (Department of 
Science and Technology and Business Processing Association of the 
Philippines 2012). !e industry has been a major player in the city’s 
economy that it contributes US$7.7 billion and employs about half a 
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million English-speaking and college-educated workers (BSP 2011). 
!e BPO sector has not only contributed to economic growth, but 
also fuelled the demand for o"ce space and residential units. A report 
shows one of the consequences of this expansion is that the demand 
for housing rose by 58 percent (Global Property Guide 2011) between 
2005 to 2008. !e government has acknowledged the importance of 
the BPO sector by naming it as a sunshine industry.
However, like most urban areas in developing countries, Metro 
Manila also has its share of problems. Rapid urbanization, growing 
population density, and the escalation of land prices have made property 
out of reach for many of the poor residents of the urban capital (Porio 
and Crisol 2004). !is can be seen in the huge urban slums which dot 
the metropolis. Figures from the ADB show that there is a backlog 
of 3.76 million units of decent and a#ordable housing, and that there 
are still 726,908 informal settler families scattered over the metropolis 
(ADB 2006). If Metro Manila’s economic stature grows, it would need 
even more laborers to cater to its service-oriented urban economy. Again, 
we turn to the BPO sector as an example. As the BPO sector grows, so, 
too, do the demand and need for services to support such o"ce-based 
workers. A report estimates that for every job in the industry, 2.5 jobs are 
created (Mitra 2011, 18) which include construction, facility maintenance, 
security services, and food and beverage. !ese services require mostly 
low-skilled labor and, therefore, are provided by individuals from relatively 
low-income households. Low-income residents often cannot a#ord legal 
housing in the urban city, especially with rising property prices, which 
increases the viability of informal settlements. Unfortunately, providing 
decent and a#ordable housing is not within the mandate of private 
capital and historically does not provide good $nancial returns. !us, 
what is happening now is the increasing displacement of low-income 
urban dwellers by urban design and increasing una#ordable prices. To 
put it more simply, they are regarded as having “diminished rights to 
recognition and consideration” (Hutchison 2007, 868).
We have seen Manila’s economic growth and contribution to the 
national economy. !e %ow of capital into the city, such as the BPO 
sector, has increased the demand for o"ce space, while the increasing 
population and level of income of urban professionals have fuelled the 
demand for residential units. But this preoccupation with attracting 
and generating more capital has also increasingly displaced low-income 
people. Before describing the process of gentri$cation in the city, we shall 
examine it as a framework for analysis.
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GENTRIFICATION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
!e classical de"nition of gentri"cation was coined by Ruth Glass 
in 1964; it describes a process in London where “many of the working 
class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle-classes—
upper and lower” (Glass 1964, xviii). However, over time and with 
many di#erent developments in the city, it was clear that the residential 
rehabilitation de"ned by Glass was only one facet of the gentri"cation 
process (Lees et al. 2008, 9). !is de"nition has expanded and 
encompassed into several meanings. !ese are: “rural gentri"cation” or 
the (re)settlement of rural areas, “new-build gentri"cation,” and even 
“super gentri"cation” (ibid., 129). !e process of gentri"cation has now 
moved on from deindustrialization in the 1960s to where the “non-
manual middle class and service employment” are now the dominant 
force in urban living (Butler 2007, 163). !ese expanded de"nitions 
have captured how the urban experience is constantly evolving, and 
reveal the attempts to capture it through the process of gentri"cation. 
However, these are de"nitions which mostly revolve around the so-
called “Global North” cities—such as London, New York, and Paris—
which are mostly found in Western developed countries. Most of 
these examples involve cases of inner-city re-investment, resulting in 
the displacement of the lower-income residents. !us, simply applying 
the concept of this kind of gentri"cation on the “Global South” is 
irresponsible, since it ignores the nuances of historical, cultural, and 
national di#erences of urban areas. But we argue that we cannot also 
discount the process of gentri"cation as a useful tool for analysis. !is is 
because it is too embedded in social science literature to be abandoned, 
and also because of the evidence that it refers to (ibid., 164). What we 
propose, then, is using a framework for gentri"cation which takes into 
account developing country experiences, yet also shows the unique 
process of gentri"cation happening in such cities. We examine Smith’s 
analysis of gentri"cation as a “neoliberal agenda.”
!e gentri"cation scholar Neil Smith (1979) "rst argued that 
gentri"cation is an economic process driven by urban land prices 
and city speculation. He further develops this point by pointing 
out the relationship between gentri"cation with globalization and 
neoliberalism. Globalization is a term for the increasing transnational 
$ows and integration of capital and goods among di#erent countries. 
Neoliberalism is a term that refers to a market-driven approach to 
social and economic policies; it is descriptive shorthand for the 
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trends toward deregulation, decentralization, commercialization, 
privatization, and the general weakening of regulation by the state 
(Lees et al. 2008, 164). Proponents of this system argue that it will 
provide a stable and rapidly growing economy, and the free markets 
will allow the transnational !ow of capital by globalization to be 
harnessed (Beja 2006). Smith’s (2002) "rst point was that the reliance 
on private capital has now replaced an urban policy concerned with 
capitalist production rather than social reproduction. #is is succinctly 
captured in his entry for “gentri"cation” in the 2000 Dictionary of 
Human Geography: “#e reinvestment of capital at the urban center, 
which is designed to produce space for a more a$uent class of people 
than currently occupies that space” (Smith 2000, 294). Smith’s second 
point, according to Lees et al. (2008, 166), is that gentri"cation has 
evolved from an urban process seen in Western cities and is now a part 
of the global urban strategy. Cities found in the Global South are being 
shaped and shifted by the investment of capital into industries such 
as outsourcing. #is transformation is being done systematically with 
large parts of the city reconstructed into a global image. However, we 
draw the line in Smith’s argument that this is a form of neo-colonialism, 
since the author de"nes it less. #is global pattern that Smith argues 
is sometimes dismissed by the point that it hegemonizes the concept 
(from a Western-developed context), and thus there is no universal 
application. We argue, though, that there remain useful elements of 
Smith’s generalization of gentri"cation, because globalization and 
neoliberalism is further accelerating the process of gentri"cation in 
Manila. As we shall see in paper, the decentralized local government 
structure (Porio 2012) and power of the private sector (Hutchcroft 
1999) have provided capital with new areas to invest in—but with 
adverse consequences. In addition, we further describe who these 
gentri"ers are in the local context. In the literature of gentri"cation 
and globalization, the global gentri"ers are seen as emissaries of capital 
(Lees et al. 2008, 169). Rofe (2003, 2512) further develops this point 
by saying that this gentrifying class is seen in prominent cities, lending 
this group a global geography. #ese are global managers who are 
hypermobile, un"xed, transnational, and dislocated from any point of 
time. #is is in contrast to Butler and Lees (2006), who profess that 
there should be a further classi"cation of these gentri"ers into super 
gentri"ers who are not as mobile and "xed in a neighborhood. In this 
context, global gentri"ers would certainly not !ock to a city such as 
Manila. But we see that these global elite and the local gentri"ers in 
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the country have both striking similarities with one another. !ey 
are highly educated, a"uent, and have high-status professions, and 
are considered white-collar professionals (Lees et al. 2008, 170). In 
Manila, these can be seen as the emerging professionals bene#tting 
from the $ow of capital, such as the growth of the BPO sector. 
In sum, we use the framework of gentri#cation, particularly 
Smith’s argument that the process of gentri#cation is a globalizing and 
neoliberal agenda. While Smith advances this idea as neo-colonialism 
(Smith 2002), we do not take this into account since this is less than 
a clear-cut de#nition. We shall focus, however, on the interplay of 
neoliberalism and gentri#cation with the displacing e%ects on Metro 
Manila’s residents—by actual displacement, by design, and by using 
the concept of non-places. No matter the di%erent mutations of 
gentri#cation, Clark’s de#nition of gentri#cation reminds us that the 
essential meaning is that the gentri#ers are of a higher socio-economic 
status than the previous ones, and “any process of change #tting this 
description is, to my understanding, gentri#cation” (Clark 2005, 258). 
In the next section, we begin to describe the gentri#cation process of 
Metro Manila.
METRO MANILA’S PECULIAR SITUATION 
Globalization and a liberal economy have created both opportunities 
and threats for developing countries. On the one hand, those who 
are able to take advantage of the increasing $ow of capital between 
borders reap much bene#t. Some studies have shown that it has 
reduced economic barriers and enhanced mobility and growth, with 
Metro Manila disproportionately gaining from this (Clausen 2010). 
Metro Manila is witnessing the expansion of salaried professionals in 
the service economy, the establishment of multi-national companies, 
and the amount of capital the city has attracted. On the other hand, 
the system also penalizes those who cannot participate, such as the 
low-skilled and low-educated urban poor who are excluded from 
economic growth (Bello 2004). In fact, high inequality remains to be 
a characteristic problem in the Philippines (Balisacan et al. 2010, 32). 
Several scholars have cast a critical eye on the economic progress 
of the capital city. Tadiar (2004) chronicled how the “$yovers” of 
Metro Manila were considered as physical dividers of the informal 
economy, represented by the poor, and those of the formal economy. 
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But such !yovers are the very symbols of the market-orientedness of 
Metro Manila. "ey are the avenues which Metro Manila’s urban elite 
use to ferry themselves to their shopping malls and o#ces, bypassing 
the roads which many public transportation vehicles use. "us, these 
!yovers serve as channels for “consumption to corporate-owned spaces 
and goods, and integrating its managerial class” (Tadiar 1995, 293). In 
addition, Connell (1999) also aptly described the economic growth of 
Metro Manila—in the forms of private spaces such as exclusive suburbs, 
shopping malls, freeways, and !yovers—as further fragmenting and 
dividing the capital. "is echoes Harvey’s work (2005, 156) where he 
argues that “neoliberalisation, the process rather than the theory, has 
been a huge success from the standpoint of the upper classes.” We 
argue that this is what is happening in Metro Manila. A neoliberal 
economy and decentralized government has allowed the private sector 
to take advantage of the situation. With the quest for global city status 
through a more liberal economy and through the amount of capital 
!owing into the city, we see that the government and the private 
sector have built freeways and !yovers which crisscross the realm of 
the public city to connect their own developments. Decentralization 
has also contributed to this peculiar situation with the private sector 
capturing local governments by developing their own projects without 
regard to the overall plan of the city. In fact, Porio (2012, 8) states that 
this decentralization has further strengthened the mayors’ stronghold 
on local politics and, to a certain extent, “this particular decentralised 
set-up allows local elite families to continue to dominate political 
leadership in these cities.” "us, we see that each administrative city 
in Metro Manila tries to compete globally by enticing consumers with 
private developments in their own areas. "e highly decentralized 
structure of the local governments leads to a scenario where there is 
no over-arching coordination from a central regional government. 
We elaborate this situation further by utilizing Shatkin’s (2008) term 
as the “privatization of planning.” He de$nes this phenomenon as 
“the transfer of power over and responsibility for the visioning of 
urban futures and the exercise of social action for urban change from 
public to private actors” (ibid., 388). "is model is consistent with 
Metro Manila’s situation where a liberal economy has allowed the 
!ourishing of large private-sector developers, and decentralization has 
allowed their local government partners to allow the !ourishing of 
enclaves owned by the private sector. Shatkin (ibid., 387–88) notes 
that there are four major actors prevalent in building a city in the 
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Southeast Asian context: 1) the government, which provides legal and 
policy frameworks; 2) private developers, who market themselves as 
innovative and build cozy relationships with government o!cials; 3) 
the consumer class, or the economic “winners” in the city, made up of 
a blend of culture-speci"c preference, such as ownership of real estate 
as a sign of progress and exposure to Western preferences through 
globalization and the media; and 4) foreign planners and architects, to 
whom private developers look for their models of urbanization, which 
primarily cater to the consumer class. He argues that the process 
is not just to look at Western models but to commodify the urban 
experience. #e whole interplay between the four actors has resulted 
in the “privatization of planning.” 
For government, central planning has not been a particular 
strong suit because of the decentralized structure of Metro Manila. 
Private developers are able to take advantage of this situation by 
constantly marketing themselves as “cutting-edge” and putting their 
own brand on the city. On the other hand, consumers are willing to 
buy real estate from these large projects as a way to show progress 
and upward mobility—notice that the names of some projects such 
as “Uptown Ritz” or “#e Venice” (Megaworld 2013) evoke mostly 
Western standards. And lastly private-developers have turned to 
foreign planners. Bonifacio Global City, a former military property, 
was planned by Helmut, Obatat, and Kassabaum (Shatkin 2008, 390) 
which is one of the largest US-based architecture and design "rms. 
What we see is a Metro Manila which is a combination of Hutchroft’s 
(1999) booty capitalism, where the private-sector captures the public 
sphere, and Harvey’s (2003a) accumulation by dispossession, where 
there is a centralization of power by the few and the wealthy by denying 
access to public resources such as land. Essentially, it is a city captured 
by the elites. #e e$ect of this overlay of urban forms is twofold: it 
excludes those who cannot properly participate, and it excludes also 
those who can participate. For the former, we mean to say that it is 
designed exclusively for the wealthier residents of the city, while for 
the latter, we use Augé’s (1995) concept of non-places. 
GENTRIFICATION AND DISPLACEMENT
Because of Manila’s distinctive form of development, where the private-
sector has virtual dominance, we see that the city is experiencing the 
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Figure 3. Eastwood City towers over the urban metropolis of Metro Manila. 
Photo by Jun Acullador.
process of gentri!cation in a much larger and overt scale. Whole urban 
chunks are being built in the city by private developers. Bonifacio 
Global City, Rockwell Center, Eastwood City, Ayala Alabang, and 
Ortigas Center are but some of the notable projects in Metro Manila 
where private developers have conceived their own spaces. Rockwell 
Center, for example, boasts that it is a “city within a city” (Rockwell 
Center 2013). "ese projects occupy a cumulative area of about 1040 
ha of land in the capital. Figure 3 shows another project, Eastwood 
City, which has not only successfully attracted international !rms such 
as IBM and Citi to locate their BPO services, but also constructed 
residential units for a self-contained and mixed use development. 
"ese urban projects evoke a sense of “islands of a#uence” (Connell 
1999, 435), where freeways and $yovers connect them to other similar 
islands. "e result of all these projects has been a “splintering” of urban 
development, where “there is the uneven overlaying and retro!tting 
of new, high performance urban infrastructures onto the apparently 
immanent, universal, and (usually) public monopoly networks” 
(Graham 2000, 185). We argue that these gentri!ying urban regions 
have three kinds of displacement e%ects: actual displacement, design 
displacement, and non-places displacement. 
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!e "rst e#ect is actual displacement where gentri"cation’s 
impact is felt in the removal of people either on the site itself or the 
“right of way” for the infrastructure to connect these urban projects. 
!e kinds of displacement that these residents experience are 
exclusionary displacement and displacement pressure (Marcuse 1985, 
208). Exclusionary displacement refers to residents who cannot access 
housing as it has already been gentri"ed. Displacement pressure, on the 
other hand, refers to dispossession su#ered during the transformation 
of the neighborhoods where they live. Exclusionary displacement is 
seen in low-income residents who are increasingly being priced out. 
For example, the already high rental average for a condominium unit 
at Rockwell Center, one of the islands of a$uence, costs P18,400 
(US$422.50) for a 25 m2 property (Global Property Guide 2011). !is is 
way above most low-income households where the minimum monthly 
wage is P7,600 (US$180). While some may regard this example as 
extreme, especially since the Rockwell Center is on the luxury segment 
of the market, we argue that it only serves to highlight how unreachable 
property is in Metro Manila to the general populace. Displacement 
pressure is seen in the planned evictions in the numerous projects 
made by private developers. !ey are not just concerned with building 
the communities itself, but also with the necessary infrastructure—
such as roads, %yovers, and trains—for access to these communities. 
!ese new spaces for production and consumption are what Shatkin 
(2008) terms as a “bypass-implement” system. !ey have increased the 
facilitation of the %ow of capital by “bypassing the congested arteries 
of the ‘public city’ and implanting new spaces for capital accumulation 
that are designed for consumerism and export-oriented production” 
(Shatkin 2008, 388). Estimates put the scale of planned evictions from 
these projects at 305,000 households. Below is a table of such planned 
evictions (see Figure 4).1
Most, if not all, of these planned evictions are informal settlers, who 
have illegally squatted in public or private lands in the decades of rapid 
urbanization of Metro Manila. !e debate, then, is if they have the 
right to reside there in the "rst place, since they are illegally squatting. 
But on the other hand, displacing them would deprive them of shelter 
and livelihood, since their survival hinges on their locations being 
near to their livelihood, which is essentially the low-skilled service 
that the city is currently depending on. Relocating them far away is 
essentially depriving them of jobs (Payne 2002, 152). We argue that 
what we essentially see in these projects is the gentri"cation process 
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(Clark 2005), where displacement occurs by capital, represented by 
the projects of private developers, and a higher socioeconomic class 
is replacing the low-income households. We see that whole urban 
chunks of Metro Manila are being reshaped by private developers.
!e second displacement e"ect is design displacement. Urban 
projects in Metro Manila are typically associated with foreign planners, 
since consumers have more “modern” preferences. !ese preferences 
are shaped by their international travels and the consumption of 
Western media which are landscapes of consumption (Pinches 1999). 
!ese are designed in such a way that only those with the right 
amount of capital—the urban elite—are able to participate. One 
example is Megaworld’s “Eastwood City,” seen in #gure 3, which 
literally stands out amidst its surrounding metropolis. In the center, 
there is a small public space resembling a garden. !is cannot be seen 
from the outside because the residential and o$ce towers encircling 
it resemble giant fences encircling the small garden. !is has both the 
purpose of keeping outsiders from entering and contributes to the 
feeling of residents that they are entering a private space of their own. 
Furthermore, jeepneys, the ubiquitous public transport of the masses, 
are not allowed inside to use its roads. So those who use it have to 
alight from outside and walk inside. Only private cars and cabs are 
allowed inside. !is has the purpose of severely limiting access to 
low-income urban residents, some of whom contribute to the service 





Expansion of R-10 Road 10,000
Cleaning of Esteros (Canals) 6,000
North Rail 40,000
South Rail 43,000
Pasig River Rehabilitation Program 21,000
Fort Bonifacio Global City 15,000




Figure 4. Planned evictions (Urban Poor Associates, cited in Shatkin 2008).
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!is exclusive design also brings us to the third kind of 
displacement: non-places displacement. We draw upon Augé’s concept of 
non-places. He describes these non-places as anonymous areas where 
an individual is alone even in a crowd (Augé 1995). He identi"ed these 
as infrastructures which are necessary to the circulation of people and 
capital, such as gas stations, airports, cars, airplanes, and the big hotels 
and supermarkets. Not only do we "nd these in Metro Manila, but the 
addition of shopping malls to the list, which are often the centerpieces 
of urban projects, add to the growing list of non-places. Augé’s point 
being that they “are are only meant to interact with texts stated by 
legal entities or institutions” (cited in Aubert-Gamet and Cova 1998, 
37–45). Such displacement is not just limited to the urban poor, these 
non-places also exclude the very people for whom such urban projects 
are designed. To enter these places, one must give up the identity at the 
entrance barrier. !ese non-places "t in perfectly with an urban form 
designed exclusively by the private sector. As one enters such shopping 
malls, one has to be stopped and searched by security guards at the 
entrance. !e proliferation of urban projects also coincides with the 
rise of these non-places. !us, the urban elites are unaware that they, 
too, are being displaced in their very place of residence.
!e gentri"cation process that is transforming the landscape of 
Metro Manila according to the elites re#ects how the urban elites 
have claimed the city for their own. !e city has been wrapped in 
the rhetoric of global competitiveness and the imperative to achieve 
a higher economic status (Shatkin 2008, 397). It has prioritized 
facilitating the #ow of capital #owing into the city and catering 
exclusively to the consumer class who pays for it. !ese two are seen as 
the most important constituents found in the city. 
Some of the government’s response of relocation and "nancing 
has been inadequate at best. On relocation, the state moves the 
residents to regions outside Metro Manila. But these have been met 
with opposition, often violent, since most of the displaced residents’ 
livelihood is within the city. And to the person with an average daily 
wage of P56 (US$1.37) who has to have all the basic necessities—such 
as housing, water, food, education, and transportation—relocating is 
simply una$ordable (Steinberg and Lind"eld 2011, 64). Programs 
which simply relocate with minimal support would mean essentially 
depriving them of their income. !us, we witness violent clashes as 
the government attempts to evict the urban poor. One notable case 
involved low-income residents being displaced from a 29-ha area to 
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be developed by a private developer (GMA Network 2010). !e sense 
of irony is prevalent as this was touted as a case for urban renewal 
and regeneration, but with the consequences of massive displacement 
for over 3,600 households. On the side of "nancing, the government 
has had more limited success. !e Community Mortgage Program 
is a housing "nance program which allows low-income families, 
speci"cally those living informally on public or private lands without 
security of tenure, to have access to a#ordable housing. Its de"ning 
feature is dispensing the need for collateral as long as they coordinate 
payments with a recognized local NGO. !e program has assisted 
106,273 poor households in securing housing and land tenure in 
854 communities (Porio et al. 2001, 54–57). Despite the perceived 
success of the program, long-term "nancing has been pulled by the 
government because of its precarious "nancial position, and chie$y 
because the "nancial viability of the program was put into question. 
With a growing economy and only a limited supply of land, the urban 
poor face an impossibly expensive housing market (Shatkin 2004, 
2481).
But this is the paradox: to remain competitive and continue its 
quest to a global city, Metro Manila has to increasingly rely on the 
service economy. However, to be able to a#ord this, this must be 
maintained at a cheap price. !us, some say that the urban poor are 
not an inconsistency in Metro Manila’s progress, but the very result 
of it. “!e dual city is not simply the urban social structure resulting 
from the juxtaposition of the rich and the poor, the yuppies and the 
homeless, but the result of simultaneous and articulated process of 
growth and decline” (Castells 1989,206). Perhaps it is Harvey (2003b) 
who is the most ardent critics of this kind of city, as seen in his essay on 
“!e Right to the City.” He refutes that the two absolute rights to the 
city are inalienable property rights and a pro"t-oriented framework. 
He suggests that the true right to the city is “the right to remake 
ourselves by creating a qualitatively di#erent kind of urban sociality” 
(ibid., 939). He further argues that endless capital accumulation only 
produces “inequality, alienation and injustice” (ibid., 941). He points 





We have seen how the city of Metro Manila is achieving economic 
progress. It has been doing so through a neoliberal approach, with an 
emphasis on deregulation, decentralization, and privatization. !ese, in 
turn, have led to the virtual dominance of the private sector in planning 
and building communities in the city. Utilizing a gentri"cation 
framework derived from Smith, we argue that this approach to 
neoliberalism has resulted in the process of gentri"cation on a large 
scale, with massive urban chunks of the city being transformed into 
islands of a#uence. !is phenomenon has three detrimental e$ects 
of displacement on the urban residents. !e "rst is actual displacement, 
where urban poor residents are physically removed from an area. !e 
second is design displacement, which limits access to the urban elite. 
And lastly, non-places displacement, where such urban projects connote 
non-signi"cance. We argue that the private sector has essentially 
captured the metropolis, and its priorities are the %ow of capital into 
the city and only consumers who are able to a$ord it can participate.
While it is out of the scope of this paper to discuss alternatives, 
we present the problems identi"ed in Metro Manila as a challenge to 
the policy makers. !ere must be coordinated and strategic e$orts for 
inclusive growth to be achieved. As an area of further research, Metro 
Manila can possibly explore ways to reform its highly decentralized 
structure. Unfortunately, until we truly heed Harvey’s (ibid.) “right to 
the city” and put the necessary democratic structures in place, we put 
forth that inequality will only worsen in Metro Manila.
NOTES
1 We acknowledge that the data is already five years old. But it is also quite revealing 
that a government central database on the number of evicted households stemming 
from urban projects is sorely lacking.
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